This chapter first examines Indo-Japanese relations to place the relationship in a wider context, and then moves on to examine how Tokyo views New Delhi in relation to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It introduces the 'China prism' and 'nuclear lens', two frameworks that significantly influence Tokyo's perception of New Delhi.
position is also reflected in Justice Radhabinod Pal's opposition to the Tokyo Tribunal judgement after Japan's defeat in WWII. Pal, the Indian representative on the Tokyo Tribunal, was the sole judge to oppose the judgement. India's sympathies with Japan also reach to the civilian level where India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru presented the Tokyo's Ueno Zoo with its first Indian elephant in 1949 to cheer up the Japanese children after the War (The Japan Forum, 2007) . vii The elephant was a popular addition to Ueno Zoo, and has since become a symbol of Indo-Japanese friendship. This historical background brings the two countries together and has carved a special place for Indo-Japanese relations.
Tokyo's Perception of New Delhi
In examining Indo-Japanese relations, certain frameworks of analysis can aid in the explanation of the various factors influencing this relationship. The Indo-Japan relationship can be viewed through a Realist lens where power and military capabilities take front stage.
The power balance between the two countries is also influenced by their respective relationships with the major players in the region, more specifically the United States and China. The US-Japan Security Alliance places Japan under the US security umbrella, and US-India relations have also warmed considerably since the end of the Cold War, making the US matter in the context of Indo-Japanese relations. Another key player is rising China, which has a rather complicated relationship with both India and Japan due to their respective territorial disputes and historical relations. However, a Realist lens does not help explain the complex dynamics between India and Japan, particularly in a non-traditional security issue such as climate change.
Liberals would place emphasis on economic relations between India and China, evidenced in collaborative projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project. The strong economic relationship between the two countries (in terms of Official Development Assistance -ODA -and Foreign Direct Investment -FDI) and the relative importance of the economic ministries in policy-making (the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan) lend some weight to a Liberal emphasis. However, this framework does not capture the unique nature of the climate change issue.
Although Realist and Liberal frameworks shed some light on Indo-Japanese relations, they require supplementation through a Constructivist approach. Constructivism's focus on the role of identity-ideas, norms, and beliefs-in state behaviour is more suitable for examining climate change, a particularly emotive issue. This is firstly due to its linkage to nuclear energy, from the Japanese side, and secondly, because of the close nature of Indo-Japanese relations. This chapter examines how values and emotions can influence Japan's assessment of India in climate change. I offer two ideational frameworks, specific to the Japan-India relationship, that distil the emotive, value considerations Tokyo emphasises in its relations with New Delhi: the 'China prism' and the 'nuclear lens'.
The 'China Prism' in Contemporary Indo-Japanese Relations
Japan has traditionally seen Indian culture through the prism of 'China'. Buddhism, one of the most important religions in Japan, originally came from India via China. However, much of Buddhist thought, teaching and iconography was transformed during its travels to Japan. viii For example, bongo, a form of writing Sanskrit that is used in Japanese Buddhism has changed in interesting ways during its translation from India to Japan via China (van Gulik, 1956 ). Thus, with the geographical distance between Japan and India, China served as an intermediary, with Japan absorbing these ideals indirectly, as it was transmitted through China. In this sense, Japan has historically absorbed aspects of Indian culture via the 'China prism'.
Although still relevant today, this prism has altered into something that, in some policy domains, focuses and defines Japan's national interest. With the rise of China, Japan views India as a partner that can counter-balance this rise, but it also means that the partnership with India is often coloured in comparison to, or in consideration with, China.
In contrast to their extensive cultural ties, political relations between India and Japan only date to the mid-nineteenth century. In 1952, India concluded a separate peace agreement with Japan following the end of WWII. Nehru refused to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference which concluded WWII, signalling that India's position was more sympathetic to Tokyo. India opposed the San Francisco Settlement since it regarded some sections to compromise Japan's sovereignty and independence (Rao, 2009 Politically and economically, India and Japan were natural partners and the post-Cold War environment brought the two even closer together. Official and economic exchange between the two countries peaked in 1997/98. For Japan, its immediate neighbourhood was no longer just the priority, thus the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) strove to build a stronger presence in India. In the eyes of Japan, India was the better partner -a developing economy with low wages that would complement Japan's economy, without the lack of rule of law or enforcement measures, which were serious issues in China (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2006) . However, this relationship was irrevocably transformed with Pokhran II, India's nuclear tests in May 1998, which brought the nuclear issue to the forefront of the relationship. Japan has been keenly sensitive towards nuclear weapons in its international relations and has not been shy in asserting its sentiments.
The 'Nuclear Lens' in Contemporary Indo-Japanese Relations
The China prism is magnified by Japan's nuclear identity. Because of Japan's experience of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and more recently of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011, the Japanese population holds a victimization complex with regard to nuclear weapons. ix Furthermore, being the sole victims of nuclear weapons, there is a belief that the Japanese have a special prerogative and moral obligation to speak out on matters relating to nuclear weapons. At the policy level, this 'nuclear identity' becomes something of a lens through which matters of foreign policy can be viewed.
The nuclear issue has a significant impact on Japan-India relations. India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, testing five nuclear devices (Pokhran II). These included an atom bomb (15kt fission device), a hydrogen bomb (45kt thermonuclear device) and subkilton device (0.2 kt device), which gave India a nuclear weapons capability (Shankar Roychowdhury, cited in Swaminathan, 2003) . For India, the tests were a 'prudent measure of future insurance in the military context of China's four modernizations. China must and will remain a permanent factor in our security perceptions' (Ibid.). After Pokhran II, Japan publically condemned India and also gathered support for criticism in other venues such as the UN, as I discuss later. Japan suspended all political exchanges and economic assistance with India for about three years. In this regard, the nuclear tests were unfortunately timed.
They were conducted just as the Indian economy was opening up and Japan was shifting its focus beyond North East Asia to find partners further afield.
With the Japanese economy slowing down and China rising in the late 1990's, India appeared as both an alternative ally and economic opportunity. As a result, MITI and Keidanren began involvement in pushing Japan's presence in India, and by 1998 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was rising reaching its peak in 1997 with 531.5 million US dollars (Jaishankar, 2000) .
After a gap of over a decade where Japan-India relations were neglected, high-level visits were being conducted by MITI and SDF (Self Defence Forces of Japan) -however, this was short-lived with Pokhran II.
The then ambassador to India, Hiroshi Hirabayashi noted 'It (the test) was particularly perceived as a slap in the face by the Japanese people. To be frank, I was rudely shocked and betrayed by India, which I believe to be an anti-nuclear champion. Pokhran (II) tests chilled our relationship to a great extent' (Hirabayashi, 2002) . This quote shows the intimate and highly emotive relations India had with Japan. This sense of 'betrayal' was reflected in Tokyo's actions following Pokhran II. There followed a 'freeze' in the bilateral relationship, as the Japanese government suspended political exchanges and economic assistance.
Ambassador Hirabayashi was recalled back to Tokyo for consultations with Prime Minister
Hashimoto. Furthermore, the Japanese Diet issued a statement that the tests were 'acts of destruction of the global environmental destruction of ecosystem of constituting a threat to the survival of human beings' (Pant, 2010) . Below, I show how Pokhran II impacted on one specific domain of Indo-Japanese relations by focussing on the case study of climate change.
Climate change brings together various complex issues: environmental protection, economic development, and nuclear energy, which make it a suitable case to examine the shifts in Tokyo's perception of New Delhi. of environmental policymaking in Japan is a complex topic, but one that will not be discussed in detail here. However, it is worth noting that decision-makers in CDM/AIJ in Japan are energy, environment and business/commerce actors with grassroots involvement. The final negotiations are conducted by MOFA, but the ideas for the projects usually come from the bottom up, with a significant degree of input from energy actors. As a result, the CDM/AIJ project ordinarily reflects the interests of energy, environment, and/or business actors first, with input from MOFA at the very end stages.
Climate Change and the Japan-India Relationship
According to the total numbers of AIJ and CDM registered at the UNFCCC (Figure 1) , it is apparent that China is placed ahead of India in the capacity as host country for these projects.
In terms of Japanese activity in these mechanisms, three out of the five Japanese AIJs are located in China with no AIJ in India during the pilot phase, that is, up until 2006. Since the AIJ moved to the CDM phase after 2006, however, India has been able to secure some Japanese CDMs, but still lags behind China. Japan fought hard at the international negotiations to seek India and China's acceptance of emissions caps for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Japan and India's prime ministers met at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in 2009 to agree to work together in 'a positive and constructive' manner on the issue of climate change issue (Tuteja, 2009) . Although there is mutual respect for each other's positions on climate change, the different developmental stages of India and Japan, which make the two economies complementary, also complicate cooperation on climate change mitigation.
However, the CDM/AIJ bridges these kinds of differences, allowing Annex I countries (for example, Japan), to reach their emissions cuts by counting the emissions reductions of the projects that Annex I countries implement in non-Annex I countries (for example, India).
Japan is one of the leading countries in climate abatement technology and one of the most active countries in the CDM/AIJ.
Out of the non-Annex I countries available for Japan to cooperate under the CDM/AIJ, India was democratic, English-speaking and relatively transparent and was thus perceived as a 'better partner' (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) According to a MOFA official, Tokyo had perhaps 'punished India too much after Pokhran II' (Author interview, 2009) . From this statement, he was referring to the lack of Japanese CDM projects in India. The CDM received a lukewarm reception when it was introduced in the 1990s, with India and China reacting particularly cautiously (Kobayashi, 2003) . However, by the late 1990s, it was seen by developing countries as an effective means to absorb climate change abatement technologies, and the discussion in the South had then became one of how to 'best attract CDM projects' (Ibid.). Since China and India were the 'big two' in climate change emissions, the CDMs in these countries were seen as key to the success of the UNFCCC. However, Figures 1 and 2 in Tokyo is a factor that should be taken into consideration.
The 'Nuclear lens' in Indo-Japanese Cooperation on Climate Change
After Pokhran II, the status of India and China switched: China was then viewed as the 'better partner, attracting more numbers of Japanese AIJs and CDMs than India. Japan's view of India in climate change is assessed in reference to China.
The Pokhran II tests shocked the global community and many countries were quick to react.
This impact was visible in India's relations with the US and the EU, not only with Japan.
Australian and European aid was cut, but these cuts were minimal in comparison to American and Japanese aid to India. Although Japan's nuclear identity is not something that is legally binding, the US on the contrary has a domestic law -the 1994 'Glenn Amendment' -which stipulates that the US impose economic sanctions (including bilateral aid, credit and loan guarantees for US firms, and multilateral credit agencies, IMF and World bank) on any country engaging in nuclear testing (Ghosh, 1998) . xv US, Japan and many European countries (excluding UK and France) suspended bilateral aid, which was equivalent to 3 billion US dollars (Ibid). In June 1998, Tokyo also refused to play host for a very important venue for discussion of Indian aid, the Aid India Consortium. No other country was willing to step in as host after Tokyo's refusal (Ibid.).
Prior to 1998, India had received an excess of 1.5 billion US dollars from Japan on an annual basis (Ghosh, 1998) . After Pokhran II, there was a cutback of roughly 1 billion US dollars of Japanese bilateral aid (except for emergency, humanitarian and grassroots assistance) that lasted approximately three years. This also impacted future aid proposals and Tokyo backed down from hosting the India Developmental Forum. Furthermore, there was a cautious examination of technological transfer, resulting in stricter control (Jaishankar, 2000) .
The official response also permeated the cultural arena with exchange between India and Japan being suspended. The Empress Michiko of Japan was due to be given the keynote speech at the International Board on Books for Young People World Congress in New Delhi in September 1998, but cancelled after Pokhran II in May 1998. Instead a recorded speech was delivered as a video message (Roy, 2013) .
Japan together with the G7 and non-G7 countries opposed lending by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India.
As WB loans are spread over four to eight years; the impact of 1998 cannot be visibly traced.
However, the WB postponed a decision to approve 865 million US dollars in project aid after Pokhran II (Sanger, 1998) . This action was under the leadership of the Japanese, but the US and EU, who are on the board of WB board of directors, played a central role in this decision.
Japan led the G8 Summit at Birmingham in 1998 to send a clear message against India's nuclear tests. At the G8 Summit, Japan rounded up support for a statement condemning India's tests as an 'intolerable challenge to international society' (Jaishankar, 2000) .
Subsequently, the South Asia Task Force was setup to coordinate pressure to cease nuclear tests on India and Pakistan, and Japan took leadership of this group (Ibid.).
In the UN Security Council, Japan coordinated with Sweden, Costa Rice and Slovenia to pass UNSC Resolution 1172 which 'demanded that those countries refrain from further nuclear tests and urged them to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), without delay and without conditions (UNSC, 1998) . At the P5 foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva, Japan also issued an appeal not to grant India and Pakistan nuclear weapon state status. Although a failure, Japan in its desire to punish India also tried to induct Pakistan into the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) (Jaishankar, 2000) .
As the Indian economy has been growing at a very high rate, it is difficult to assess the impact of the sanctions imposed on India after Pokhran II. However, according Morrow and
Carriere, it is apparent that FDI suffered a direct impact after May 1998. This impact was also felt in the credit ratings as the condemnations of various governments had a direct influence on India's performance in these ratings (Morrow and Carriere, 1999) .
The impact of Pokhran II was also visible in climate change, as I have shown above. Japan also made clear that the country's position was not negotiable for nuclear issues. After 1998, India was replaced by China as the 'better partner' for CDMs, and as a result India never caught up in the race to attract CDM projects. CDM was no longer only a means for Japan to meet its emissions cuts, but was an important means for developing countries such as India and China to access emissions abatement technologies -missing out on these projects was detrimental for India, and was something that India never recovered from, even after Indo-Japanese relations improved later in the mid-2000s.
Post-Pokhran II Indo-Japanese relations
The India' (MOFA, 2006) . The 2008 'Security Accord' is a framework agreement with 'an action plan on specific measures to advance security cooperation in particular areas, ranging from sea-lane safety and defence collaboration to disaster management and counterterrorism' (Chellaney, 2008) . For Japan, this kind of close partnership is only otherwise seen with the United States.
On the economic front, by the mid-2000s, India was viewed to be on par with China as an economic opportunity (Mathur, 2012 (Nishigahiro, 2004) . However, the number of Japanese CDMs in India has yet to equal the country's importance in climate change. When we compare Figure 1 Several years later, the bilateral relationship is in recovery, but, at least as far as cooperation through the CDM is concerned, there is still some way to go. China and nuclear politics remains a central reference point in Indo-Japan relations.
